War... Warlight never changes

Edit: is that the background image of the map :p

Edited 12/27/2022 17:29:55

HYPE

why does comming have 2 m

2m is a hint

COMMUNISTSTSTSTSTSTS°°°!!!!!!

I read cumming soon … what is wrong with me.

Jokes aside I am very hyped to see what you have in store for us Lionheart!

This is turning out to be a Fizzer style 'soon'

gta 6 is also soon

Eight Days in Hell

In 1944, the Palau Islands stood as one of the key strongholds in Japan’s second line of defense. As General Douglas MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief of the Southwest Pacific Area, began planning his return to the Philippines, the Palaus, about 550 miles to the east, posed a potential problem. Aircraft based on the group’s Peleliu Island might interdict MacArthur’s lines of communication and supply to the Philippines. The general came to believe he could not mount a successful amphibious campaign unless the possible danger was eliminated.

Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, agreed. He directed the seizure of Peleliu to “remove a definite threat from Mac- Arthur’s right flank, and to secure a base to support his operation into the southern Philippines.” Nimitz designated the operation Stalemate II and assigned an invasion target date of 15 September 1944.

On 2 June 1944, the 1st Marine Division received Nimitz’s warning order. At the time, it was resting and reorganizing from the strenuous New Britain campaign on the tiny island of Pavuvu, just north of Guadalcanal. By the end of August, the division’s operational plans were complete, and on 4 and 8 September, it mounted out for Peleliu.

Terrain and Defenses

Barely six miles long from northeast to southwest, with a maximum width of slightly more than two miles, Peleliu is a coralline-limestone formation, shaped roughly like a lobster claw. The Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Service erroneously described Peleliu’s terrain as “low and flat,” except for the high ground along the upper half of its western pincer.

This ridge system had the almost unpronounceable name Umurbrogol Mountain; Marines would nickname it “Bloody Nose Ridge.” The mountain was a series of broken coral ridges, narrow valleys, and rugged peaks, some rising to 550 feet, pocked with caves and crevices. Thick jungle scrub cloaked the slopes, masking their rugged contours from aerial observation. Colonel Merwin Silverthorn, Chief of Staff, III Amphibious Corps, remarked: “They looked like a normal ridge. But when we denuded it through gunfire and aerial bombardment, we found that there were these funny shaped ridges that were as steep as a roof of a house. And instead of one ridge as it appeared under the foliage, there might be three or four parallel ridges with deep ravines in between.”

The Japanese used this nightmare of crags, pinnacles, and coral rubble honeycombed with natural and man-made caves to bolster their defenses. They were masters at hewing the coral ridges and cleverly camouflaging their positions, from one-man spider holes to enormous four- or five-story caves. Elsewhere on the island, the defenders manned similar, though generally smaller-scale, defensive positions.

The backbone of the Japanese garrison consisted of the elite 2nd Infantry Regiment—some 3,000 troops backed by miscellaneous support units for a total of between 10,300 and 10,700 men—under the command of 44-year-old Colonel Kunio Nakagawa.

Plan of Attack

The 1st Marine Division’s operational plan called for the landing of three regiments abreast on a 2,200-yard beach on the southwest coast of Peleliu. The 1st Marines was to land its 3d Battalion (3/1) on White Beach 1 and 2d Battalion (2/1) on White Beach 2, with its 1st Battalion (1/1) in regimental reserve. The 5th Marines would land two battalions on Orange Beach 1 and 2, with one battalion in regimental reserve, and the 7th Marines was to land two battalions on Orange Beach 3, with one battalion in divisional reserve. The goal was to land 4,500 men during the invasion’s first 19 minutes. The initial eight waves were to come ashore in amphibian tractors—LVTs—designed to carry 20 men, preceded by a wave of amphibian tanks—LVT(A)s—mounting 75-mm howitzers or 37-mm antitank guns.

The division’s scheme of maneuver gave the 1st Marines, under legendary Colonel Lewis B. “Chesty” Puller, the toughest nut to crack. It was to drive inland, pivot left, and attack northeast, straight at Bloody Nose Ridge and into the teeth of the main Japanese defense system.

Twenty-nine-year-old Major Raymond G. Davis, a 1938 graduate of Georgia Tech and a veteran of the Guadalcanal and Cape Gloucester campaigns, commanded 1/1. The unit was scheduled to come ashore an hour after the initial landing. Davis later said, “My battalion landed in reserve, which was meaningless, because the Japanese defenses were so thick and so sturdy.”

Into the Cauldron of Battle

At 0910, with the battle already raging, 1/1 started in to the beach. An officer in the battalion wrote rather tongue in cheek that “mortar shells began falling around all the LVTs; the Japs had apparently sited their heavy weapons to cover the area between the reef and the shore, and were making the situation uncomfortable.” Three tractors in his wave were hit going in; their ammo exploded and scattered burning debris over the water. According to Captain Everett P. Pope, skipper of 1/1’s C Company: “When we came in, I could see aircraft strafing the beach. I could count twelve individual fires . . . and I thought this was going to be OK until I realized they were amtracs [LVTs] and then I knew we were in for difficult times—and we were!”

Davis recalled: “When I got off the amphibian tractor on the beach, my run for cover was not quick enough, and I got a fragment from a mortar shell through my left knee. It wasn’t serious—I just put tape over it and got to work.” The major had a hard time gathering his men. Private First Class Robert Fisher estimated it took “about an hour . . . to collect most of the battalion in one area along the beach. Major Davis ordered us to dig in.” His forward command post “was a little more than a hundred yards in from the water.”

About another 100 yards inland, a heavily defended 30-foot-high long coral ridge was posing a serious problem for 2/1 and parts of 3/1, on the front line ahead of Davis’s supporting battalion. Covered in foliage, it had gone unnoticed during preinvasion reconnaissance of the island, Davis recalled.

Meanwhile, the 1st and 3d platoons of 3/1’s K Company were advancing on the heavily fortified “Point,” a small peninsula just to the north of the landing beaches. Enemy guns there were able to enfilade the landing beaches. The platoons succeeded in capturing the strongpoint, but a dangerous gap developed between the units and the main Marine line. The 3d Battalion tried to close the opening but met ferocious Japanese resistance.

At 1300, after 3/1 had exhausted its resources, Davis was ordered to fill the breach. The job fell to A Company, which took up position in a Japanese antitank ditch in front of the coral ridge. However, as the battalion after-action report noted, “Snipers and automatic weapons sited down this ditch hit ‘A’ Company with damaging enfilade fire from their left flank while they were facing east toward the [coral] ridge.” Davis next committed B Company to close the gap, but it was stopped cold by heavy enemy fire from the ridge.

The major finally threw in C Company, his last fresh infantry unit, against the coral ridge. It managed to capture a section of the high ground. However, Japanese small-arms, mortar, and artillery fire had taken a heavy toll on the attacking Marines. The advance stalled, and the K Company platoons at the Point remained isolated. Recognizing the danger, Colonel Puller gathered a scratch force of headquarters personnel and a hundred men from the 1st Engineer Battalion to build up a second line behind the north flank.

Davis’s utterly spent battalion meanwhile dug in for the night. As darkness fell, exhausted Marines peered out into a nightmare no man’s land of shattered trees and blasted coral rock. Parachute flares turned this broken landscape into an eerie patchwork of green light and shadow. In places along the 1st Battalion’s front line, the Japanese counterattacked, with the fighting becoming hand-to-hand before the assaults were beaten back by superior firepower.

Edited 1/11/2023 10:20:48

A Slow Advance

The second day ashore, 1/1 was ordered to continue its attacks, with the coral ridge still posing a thorny problem, as the 5th Marines, on the 1st Marines’ right flank, pivoted northward across the island’s airfield. Davis recalled his battalion “got off in good order . . . heading north. We went some 200 to 300 yards and ran into the beginnings of a fortified area . . . right into the heart of it. We couldn’t move without getting shot at from two to three directions.”

B Company and then C Company fought their way through the enemy defenses, in the process making contact with the isolated K Company platoons. The battalion report stated:

The area through which “B” and “C” Companies worked [was] rutted with anti-tank ditches and a network of camouflaged pillboxes connected by trenches on the low and flat ground. The coral ridge was honeycombed with rifle pits and machine gun nests. In particular, a pillbox with a pair of twin-mounted .80-caliber machine guns gave us a great deal of difficulty.

The battalion command group, advancing behind the assault units, passed dead B Company Marines and a deep antitank ditch littered with the dead of A and K companies. According to 1/1’s report, “It was apparent that the Japs had sited anti-tank weapons from the left flank and mortars from the ridges to the front to cover this ditch well, and [their] riflemen and mortars made the ground untenable.”

After preparing defenses, 1/1 had another restless night, with continuous firing by both sides punctuated by grenade explosions. The battalion’s report noted, the Japanese “tried fire crackers to draw out automatic fire but were unsuccessful as the men were season[ed] troops by this time and fired only when distinct targets were available.”

The Blockhouse

The advance continued on D+2, with the 1st Marines’ 3d Battalion on 1/1’s left flank and the 2d Battalion on its right flank. But after about an hour, heavy fire from in and around a large concrete blockhouse with walls four feet thick halted the 1st Battalion. A dozen pillboxes connected by tunnels supported the Japanese strongpoint. The blockhouse and pillboxes had not been damaged, despite the Navy’s claim that all enemy targets in the area had been destroyed.

“I took 25 casualties, including three dead, trying to take that objective,” Davis recalled. He finally pulled back his men and directed his naval gunfire forward observer to knock it out. Two 14-inch shells from the USS Mississippi (BB-41) settled the issue. An eyewitness reported, “The blockhouse began disintegrating, the big armor-piercing and high-capacity shells crumbled the walls, and their terrific concussion killed those Japanese missed by fragmentation.”

Bloody Nose Ridge

The 1st Marines continued its advance before halting on a road at the base of Bloody Nose Ridge to reorganize before assaulting the heights. But, according to the regimental battle history: “Mortar and artillery fire began cutting our exposed front lines to ribbons under perfect observation. The First Battalion . . . absorbed terrific punishment. . . . As quickly as possible the assault units were reformed to storm the Japanese out of their emplacements on the bluffs.” Davis called up M4 Sherman tanks, which fired point-blank into the mouths of caves, while his riflemen inched forward.

The Marines clawed upward. Historian George McMillan noted: “The pock-marked surface offered no secure footing even in the few level places. It was impossible to dig in. . . . The jagged rocks slashed their shoes and clothes, and tore their bodies every time they hit the deck for safety.”

Davis explained: “Men fought and died along faint paths that ended abruptly in sheer cliffs. They had to turn around and backtrack.” By afternoon, on 1/1’s left flank C Company had seized Hill 150 and part of Hill 180, while A Company, in the center, had captured Hill 160. But the gains had come at a huge cost: 250 casualties. A company commander reported, “We’re up here, but we’re knee-deep in Purple Hearts.” Thirty-five caves had been captured.

The Japanese, however, were not the only enemy the Marines were facing. Brigadier General Oliver P. Smith, assistant commander of the 1st Marine Division, noted: “The thermometer went up to 105 degrees. In the intense fight over rugged ground, the men soon exhausted their canteens. Resupply was difficult. We began to have a good many cases of heat exhaustion.”

Above and Beyond

At 0600 the next morning, D+3, the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, relieved 1/1 on the front line. After falling back to the blockhouse, the 1st Battalion’s men received a hot meal. Weapons were repaired, ammunition was issued, and the unit was reorganized. That afternoon, B Company received orders to rejoin the fight. The previous day, 2/1 had seized Hill 200, but now, amid counterattacks, its situation was desperate. To relieve the pressure and establish an observation post, B Company assaulted and seized Hill 205, off the northeastern flank of 200. But its subsequent attack against a complex of rugged peaks was repulsed.

Early on the 19th, D+4, B Company went into reserve behind 2/1 but still suffered heavy casualties from Japanese shell fire. Despite 1/1’s severe losses, Captain Pope’s C Company was attached to the 2d Battalion, replacing B Company, and ordered to seize Hill 100, a vital piece of terrain that in the Marines’ hands would allow them to attack Bloody Nose Ridge from the rear. A Company, detached to support the 2d Battalion on Hill 200, would suffer from heat exhaustion as well as enemy fire.

C Company spent the afternoon fighting across swampy ground traversed by a causeway below Hill 100. Three Sherman tanks lent support, but two slid off the causeway. At 1700, the unit’s survivors stormed the height as nearby Marines of 3/5 cheered them on, but they discovered Hill 100 was not a high point but the tip of a ridge. Davis recalled:

As twilight fell, the Marines took [any] cover they could among the jumbled rocks. The Japanese went for Pope’s men after dark, and they kept coming . . . two Japanese suddenly materialized near the position defended by Lt. Francis Burke . . . and Sergeant James P. McAlarnis. One of the Japanese ran a bayonet into Burke’s leg. Burke tore into his attacker beating him senseless with his fists. McAlarnis, meanwhile, went to work on the second Japanese with his rifle butt. They tossed the bodies over the precipice.

As dawn approached, C Company was down to about a dozen men and was running out of ammunition. “Pope received orders to withdraw,” Davis continued. “The order came just as the last Japanese assault began to sweep the survivors off the ridge. Those who could scrambled down the slope as fast as they could. . . . [O]nly nine made it down safely.” Among the wounded was the captain, who had been hit in the legs by shrapnel.

C Company’s heroic fight marked the end of major fighting for Davis’s command, and on D+7 the virtually destroyed battalion went into reserve, having suffered 71 percent casualties. Overall, the 1st Marines would sustain 56 percent casualties. Everett Pope was 1/1’s only company commander to walk off the island. Not one of the battalion’s nine infantry platoon commander survived the battle.

General Smith reported a truly staggering butcher’s bill: “In this six-day assault against the high ground north of the airfield the 1st Marines engaged in one of the bitterest fights in the Pacific War. . . . [T]he regiment had suffered 1,737 casualties (209 killed in action and 1,438 wounded in action). It had killed an estimate 3,700 Japanese in the eight days it had been in the lines.” Davis commented, “We could have saved a lot of lives by not trying to take the whole island. After we secured the airfield, we should have pulled back, got into a siege stage, got our guns up, and just pounded the place.” The major received the Navy Cross for his “extraordinary heroism” while leading his men on Peleliu.

A reporter asked Davis’s battered men as they came off the lines, “You the 1st Battalion?” One of the survivors wearily replied, “There ain’t no more 1st Battalion.”

U.S. forces would not secure Peleliu until 27 November.

Edited 1/11/2023 10:31:48

http://www.wtj.com/articles/peleliu/map_01_s_html5_canvas.html

http://www.wtj.com/articles/peleliu/map_02_n_html5_canvas.html

http://www.wtj.com/articles/peleliu/map_03_g_html5_canvas.html

Edited 1/11/2023 10:52:22

ive read a boo k on the pacific war and got a detailed account on the slaughter of 1st battalion, always makes me wonder why they had to be stupid and scour every single island even after they got their main objectives (airports, docks, etc).
excited for the map!